This article challenges the common characterisation of George W. Bush's foreign policy as "unilateral." It argues that the Bush administration developed a new post-9/11 understanding of terrorism as a transnational, networked phenomenon shaped by the forces of globalisation. This led to a new strategic emphasis on bi-and multilateral security co-operation and counterterrorism operations, especially outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, driven by the perceived need to counter a transnational security challenge present in multiple locations. This (flawed) attempt to engage with transnational security challenges supplemented the existing internationalist pillar of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Highlighting the transnational realm of international relations and the ways in which the Bush administration was able to co-opt other states to tackle perceived transnational challenges also shows the high importance the administration attached to concerted action even as it frequented eschewed institutional multilateralism.
The almost binary distinction between unilateralism and multilateralism that is often invoked is challenged by political scientists such as Sarah E. Kreps (2011 ), Martha Finnemore (2004 , Stephen Brookes and William Wohlforth (2005) , who offer more nuanced theories of a spectrum of action that spans pure unilateralism at one end, and comprehensive institutional multilateralism at the other, taking into account both procedural and operational dimensions of policy. These theories tend to eschew descriptions of US foreign policy as either multilateral or unilateral, positing instead that pure unilateralism is rare, and that -in Kreps words -'multilateralism can take many forms' -its character dependent on equality of decision-making, use of established multilateral institutions, and differing levels of operational commitment (Kreps 2011: 4, 15-21) .
Taking a historical approach, this article builds on Kreps' analysis, and extends our understanding of the Bush administration's attitude to coalition building and alliance management by focusing on its approach to transnational challenges -a realm thus far overlooked, and one in which the administration recognised that 'acting alone' was impossible because transnational challenges crossed borders and were therefore inherently multilateral. My argument is here is that after 9/11 the Bush administration developed a transnational security outlook and, over time, this was visible in its practice too. The devastating asymmetric attacks by a transnational network of non-state actors on September 11, 2001 , were the catalyst for a new appreciation of transnational challenges and networked adversaries. This newfound transnational sensibility led, out of necessity, to the evolution of many policies and strategies that were deliberately bilateral and multilateral in practice -activities that took place concurrently in multiple locations in order to tackle transnational challenges. Although the Bush administration's aversion to institutional multilateralism remained, it recognised that working with allies was of the highest operational and strategic importance when it came to tackling transnational threats. What is missing from the much of the existing literature, with its focus on statebased issues and the constraints imposed by international organisations, is that the Bush administration's aversion to institutional multilateralism did not mean that it downplayed the importance of working with allies when it came to transnational issues; in fact this was considered to be the sine qua non of a successful approach to tackling them. The result was the gradual development of a global constellation of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, led by the United States, designed to tackle transnational terrorismconsidered by the Bush administration to be the most salient transnational danger of the 21 st century. This was, I will argue, an imperfect response to a transnational problem:
while the Bush administration sought to work with multiple partners across a diverse set of locations, only a supranational authority could reach out beyond Washington's preferred coalition partners and co-ordinate truly comprehensive global action.
In making this argument, I defer to Akira Iriye's definition of transnationalism, which refers to 'movements and interactions among people, goods, and interactions across national boundaries, as well as to non-national entities ' (2012: 121-41) . This, of course,
was not a new phenomenon, but something that had speeded up immensely as a result of the contemporary wave of globalisation that first took hold in the 1970s (Tyrrell 2015 : 6, Sargeant 2011 (DoD 2004: 23) . This required a comprehensive national strategy premised on both internationalism and (however imperfectly) transnationalism.
The final caveat to this argument about transnationalism is that it should not be interpreted as an attempt to cast the Bush foreign policy in a progressive light.
Multilateralism is no guarantee of strategic wisdom or ethical probity; it indicates only that other states believed it was in their interest to work with rather than against the United States. As Brooks and Wohlforth comment, 'Any policy may be wise or unwise, and many policies followed by the Bush administration doubtless fall into the latter category ' (2005: 510) . What an examination of the administration's multilateral and bilateral initiatives demonstrates is the extent to which its foreign policy interests were often shared by other countries and that, for all the controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq, and despite the impact of that event on America's 'soft power' appeal (Nye 2004b ), the United States government was far from isolated during the Bush years.
9/11 AND THE NEW SECURITY LANDSCAPE
The destruction wrought on the United States on 9/11 by a transnational network of terrorists challenged the conventional state-based national security paradigm that had guided US foreign policy in previous decades and, gradually, led to the development of a new consensus in the administration on transnationalism and, by extension, bilateralism and multilateralism. For Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, the asymmetric nature of the attack challenged long-standing assumptions about the primacy of conventional state-based challenges: "The United States was the most powerful country in the world -militarily and economically. And yet, we had not been able to prevent a devastating attack by a stateless network of extremists, operating from the territory of one of the world's poorest countries. Our entire concept of what constituted security had been shaken" (Rice 2011: 79) .
For Rumsfeld, the 9/11 attacks confirmed his view of the contemporary security environment: it was 'a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action' (DoD 2003a: foreword). In fact, even before 9/11 Rumsfeld had begun to warn that a state-based view of global security might be out- (Rumsfeld 2001: 3) . Reflecting Rumsfeld's Terms of Reference, the final QDR report, released three weeks after 9/11, acknowledged that a planning system that focused primarily on conventional threats was out of date because the nature of armed conflict was changing 'in ways that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent' (DoD 2001: 3) . In a globalized world 'it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.' It should be capable of imposing its will 'on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities' (DoD 2001: iv, 12) . Even the President, who preferred to act as 'the decider' rather than propose policy initiatives of his own, recognized that the 9/11 attack did not come from a conventional state adversary: 'this would be a different kind of war. We faced an enemy that had no capital to call home and no armies to track on the battlefield.' (Bush 2010: 141; CNN 2006) . continued to play some role in facilitating terrorism -because 'Terrorists must have a physical base from which to operate' -it was important to move away from a statecentric view of the world because 'the classic net assessment of the enemy based on the number of tanks, airplanes or ships does not apply to these non-state actors' (NSCT 2003: 16,6, 17-18 States needed the support and co-operation of other countries.
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY
Building security capacity in partner states was an essential part of the war on terror from the outset because of the transnational character of the most salient security threat the United States faced. Bilateral and multilateral train and equip programmes designed to bolster internal security in allied states that were allegedly vulnerable to terrorist penetration were a key component of the war on terror. Train-and-equip programmes were nothing new in and of themselves, but after 9/11 the rationale for them was different. Whereas during the Cold War these programmes were designed to ensure that states -often those located in the Global South -did not tilt towards the Soviet Union, in the war on terror these programmes targeted weak and failing states. Where once state sponsorship of terrorism had been the problem, now it was 'ungoverned space' that The "war on terror" on the periphery
The earliest security building partnerships were instituted in the secondary, or "peripheral", fronts of the war on terror across Africa, in the Philippines, and in the former Soviet republic of Georgia (Ryan 2011 Officer, Major Steve Cox, the purpose of the force was 'to oversee operations in support of the global war on terrorism in the Horn of Africa.' More specifically, it would 'detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists who pose an imminent threat to coalition partners in the region. We'll also work with host nations to deny the re-emergence of terrorist cells and activities by supporting international agencies working to enhance long-term stability for the region.' According to Major General John F. Sattler, Commander of the Djibouti task force, 'the porous borders with Somalia' were a key concern, but the mission as a whole was 'very broad, in that we [are] to track transnational terrorism across the Horn of Africa, going from Yemen across the Gulf of Aden, and then, you know, the entire Horn'
(DoD 2003b). 
Expanding Security Assistance
The train-and-equip programmes in Africa, the Philippines, and Georgia were the templates for a broader and more flexible security assistance authorization that permitted the Pentagon to undertake train-and-equip missions anywhere in the world. General John For the Pentagon, however, the train and equip authority was a key tool for tackling transnational threats on a global scale.
Another instantiation of the renewed emphasis on bi-and multi-lateral action was
Rumsfeld's review of the DoD's Theater Engagement Plan process. In 1998, the Pentagon began requiring Combatant Commanders to publish Theater Engagement Plans encompassing peacetime security cooperation designed to proactively shape the environment in advance of hostilities (Steinke and Tarbet 2000; Dyekman 2007 ).
However, the 1998 directive provided limited policy guidance or strategic direction, and no priorities across different theatres (Dyekman 2007 It should also be noted that security assistance and train-and-equip programmes were not forced on unwilling recipients, but relied instead on friendly and co-operative bilateral and multilateral relationships in which US allies were given some scope to shape the character of the US presence. They were, in essence, coalitions of the willing. In the Philippines, for example, the US presence was encouraged and welcomed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In 2000, Arroyo had negotiated a security assistance training package from US Pacific Command (PACOM) to aid the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their battle against separatist forces in the Bangsamoro region (Briscoe 2004a and . After 9/11, she was keen to expand the bilateral programme and quickly cast Manila's battle against the ASG as part of the United States' war on terror:
'We have our own home-grown terrorism and to the extent that we can obliterate terrorism all over the world, then our own terrorism will be much easier to neutralize.'
Arroyo candidly acknowledged 'the silver lining' of the tragedy: 'We expect to have more international cooperation for our efforts' (Lander 2001 recognized explicitly that the maritime domain was a transnational jurisdiction that was not controlled by any single state, and that it was also subject to 'a variety of transnational threats that honor no national frontier', some of which were unique to the maritime domain, such as piracy (NSMS 2005: 25, 4-5) . The oceans were 'of enormous importance to …the security and prosperity' of all nations, and 'like all other countries, the United States is highly dependent on the oceans for its security, and the welfare of its people and economy.' But because the world's seas were part of the 'global commons under no States's jurisdiction,' collective international action was essential:
Success in securing the maritime domain will not come from the United States acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, Indonesia and Malaysia were opposed to non-nationals patrolling their waters, but they were prepared to accept other forms of assistance from Washington: in FY06 and FY07, the US gave Indonesia $47.1m in maritime security equipment, while Malaysia received $16.3m (Storey 2009: 44) . This was further proof that US partners had the capacity to shape the character of the US presence in their region. Parallel regional maritime security initiatives were also implemented in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (the Caspian Guard and by 2007 at 427 strong (Garamone 2002b; International Crisis Group 2008: 15) .
Moreover, the complete lack of information about any maritime interdictions carried out under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative after the A.Q. Khan seizure in 2004 suggests that the group has achieved little else since. However, the consensual character of the US programmes in these regions suggests that Washington should not shoulder the entire blame for these failed policies: while the United States was certainly the more powerful partner and led these initiatives, it did not impose them on unwilling recipients, but acted with the consent and active participation of other states that judged it to be in their interest to work with the United States. If the label 'unilateralism' is to mean anything it should not be applied to such policies. Moreover, when assessing the extent to which a government tilts towards unilateralism, it is important to assess its approach to transnational phenomena. As Ikenberry concludes, in the long-term interdependence is likely to drive more multilateral policies (2003: 540) . In other words, the more salient transnational phenomena become, the less likely future administrations are to embrace forms of unilateral action.
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